Introduction
Where "inter-institutional harmony is of the utmost importance" (Geldenhuys 2008), effective service delivery by government institutions should draw on unique local structures. This is an outcome of three fold pressure: a need for specialised government organisations to work together, providing government services through a single window, and the importance of addressing local needs in synergy (Goss 2001) . Goss (Ibid) argues that this coordination calls for "public bodies [to] purchase services from other public, voluntary or private organisations" which demands considerable emphasis on strategic planning and "in many cases shared delivery systems still do not work smoothly". The nature and success of coordination is one of the determining factors of organisational effectiveness (Crowston 1997; Stokes & Hewitt 1976; Thompson 1967) . With an appreciation of the need for intergovernmental coordination, the present paper seeks to address what is happening at the operational level of inter-governmental relations and how this can be improved in order to achieve the policy goals of effective service delivery in West Bengal, through 'line departments': rural local governments -the Panchayats -and government departments such as education, health, public works etc., which are supposed to work 'in line' with the local governments -hence their name. The case of West Bengal is not typical because decentralisation has been effectively pursued, so problems here indicate broader issues that need to be addressed.
Intergovernmental Relations: Existing Perspectives
Government institutions have a complex nature, with actors often having multiple cultural backgrounds, and where the system lacks normative underpinning in public opinion.
Consequently, the system requires strong coordination (Miller & Dickson 1996) . One approach is to understand intergovernmental relations through descriptive analysis aimed at identifying:
• the nature of governmental units;
• the nature of officials and their attitudes, perceptions and roles;
• patterns of interaction;
• the range of officials involved -elected representatives and appointed officials for example, and policies to be implemented (Wright 1988) .
A second approach looks analytically at historical trends in relations among governments (Conlan 1988 ) and identifies distinctive features in a given historical phase (Grodzins 1966; Stewart 1984) .
A third "Community Power" approach (Krane & Wright 2000, p. 86) addresses the ways in which local government officials exercise political power.
Enhancement of inter-organisational linkages should involve careful observation of institutional environments, procedural and structural aspects, and subjective dimensions.
Therefore, an effective design for coordination should see an organisation as an open system affected by its environment (Scott 1992) . Furthermore, it is vulnerable to its context especially in dealing with issues of information processing, which ought to match the institutional environmental demands (Tushman & Nadler 1978) . The interdependence of the parts within the organisational whole is a challenge to institutional collaboration, as it enhances role confusion and complexity of the system (Lawrence & Lorsch 1967; Thompson 1967) . In larger systems, coordination is not practicable through simple group meetings (Galbraith 1973; Kiesler et al.1994; Thompson 1967 ; Van de Ven et al. 1974) , as the structures and processes are interwoven. The components of linkages, like ongoing conversations, discourse, shared human experiences and interaction patterns (Foucault 1971; Schutz 1967; Weick 1979) , create meaning, social worlds, norms, shared interpretive schemes, understanding, common rituals and knowledge, coordination, and social order (Bechky 2003; Habermas 1984; Schein 1992; Wageman 1995; Weick 1993; Schutz 1967; Chwe 2001; Hutchins 1990; Weick et al. 1993; Polanyi 1975) .
We need to look carefully at these issues to understand their processes and how they are embedded within the structure. Therefore, for designing an effective strategy of coordination, due emphasis should be given to the subjective dimensions (Bastien & Hostager 2001) , including mental models, frameworks and scripts (Weick 1995; Gioia & Poole 1984; Levesque et al. 2001) , knowledge (Adler & Borys 1996; Hutchins 1991) , shared meaning/mutually shared fields (Kickert et al. 1997 , and rules and resources (Giddens 1984) .
However, we realise that management of networks is not restricted to achievement of interorganisational coordination alone. It "involves the application of applied behavioural science techniques such as team building, conflict resolution skill, and coordinating abilities" (Agranoff & McGuire 1999, p. 109-10) . The success of the network depends both on how far the network manager has taken care of the technical, legal and political dimensions (Ibid, p.
107-8) and on the extent to which she adopts a meta-governance approach. Thus, only persons who have the capacity to handle this diverse array of tasks are suitable for the role of a network manager. The introduction of these actors result in the creation of a heterogeneous network comprising local governments and other departments that not only differ in structure and culture but also in terms of goal, power and relationship with society (Klijn 2005) . Also, while selectively activating the network one should be extremely careful about two factors:
which actors are selected (and who are not selected), and what information is shared (Kickert et al. 1997, p. 47) .
Approach and Methodology
While attempting to understand the operational level of intergovernmental coordination of the Panchayat system of West Bengal, we use both descriptive and analytic approaches, which are backed by field narratives inspired by the community power approach. We studied policy documents and activity maps in order to gain insights about mechanisms of coordination as established. We have done fieldwork in six District offices and twelve Block offices (sub-district) by selecting two from each of the districts. We studied a total of twenty four Village Panchayats, selecting two from each of the Blocks to analyse problems faced by the officials due to lack of co-ordination. The paper therefore contains a descriptive presentation of policies designed to strengthen coordination, identifies gaps, and presents systemic problems and their operational consequences . Analysis of the reasons for failure of coordination analysed through studying the complex organisational structures.
The Indian context
In India, the 73rd constitutional amendment of 1992, which received presidential assent early in 1993, recommended decentralisation of twenty-seven areas of government jurisdiction, including agriculture, irrigation, health, and education to the Panchayats, the village level self-government body. The system is prone to interdepartmental incompatibilities, when departments with different business goals have to work together. The local government manager formulates the goal, identifies the potential partners and creates the network for their project management (Meuleman 2008) . Coordination becomes a big challenge (Thompson 1967) because a) the chance of blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues (Putnam 1993) , and b) ambiguities about the roles played by different stakeholders increases (Alper et al. 1998; Blake & Mouton 1970; Broadbent et al. 1996; Lax & Sebenius 1986 ).
The system is prone to power struggles and opportunistic behaviour (Hirchman 1991) where inter-organisational coordination requires careful manufacturing of 'rules of the game' to blend capacities of stakeholders to meet their organisational objectives (Jessop 1996) . If the organisation fails to design an effective mechanism for interdepartmental coordination, constructive negotiation and stakeholders' willingness to engage in problem-solving behaviour becomes crucial (De Dreu et al. 1999; Fisher & Ury 1981; Rubin et al. 1994; Thomas 1992; Tjosvold 1991; Van de Vliert et al. 1997) . This achieved when employees take into account both the goals of their own department, and also the goals of other departments (Blake & Mouton 1970; Rubin et al. 1994; Thomas 1976) .
Intergovernmental relations in operation
The local government system therefore needs better information flows between various stakeholders and better management of complexity, since the system is large and tasks are cumbersome.
The need for coordination is also recognised by the Government of India. The recent Annual The analysis of policy documents shows the primary emphasis for building effective collaboration has been on a) activity mapping of the various stakeholders, and b) organising group meetings.
Mapping of Activities: Existing Mechanism and Problems
A detailed analysis was undertaken from activity mapping of internal Government Orders In addition, the system is heavily dependent on standing committee meetings and monthly meetings for a collaborated and integrated approach. The analysis of annual reports as well as gazetteers shows that no formal stipulation is made for effective collaboration between local government and line departments.
Issues of Co-ordination
With the Government of West Bengal's commencement of provisions of the 73rd amendment, the Panchayati Raj institution is expected to be formally strengthened with the process of participatory and decentralised planning. However, the ways to 'endeavour for coordination' or 'desist from the disruption' remain unexplained. The gazette talks about the possible 'mismatch' 11 of initiatives taken by line departments and Panchayat, but there is no mention about the ways to avoid this mismatch. It is presumed that the standing committee meetings will mitigate these issues. However, it is important to address the following question: Why do the line department officials remain reluctant to attend the meetings? Is it solely because of role confusion and absence of strict mandates? Or has it something to do with the present organisational structure? To address the question, an analytical study of the organisational structure of the Panchayat system was undertaken. Figure 1 shows the organisational structure of the Panchayat system currently in operation.
The organisational structure shows that although line departments are linked to the three tiers of the Panchayat system, they are not accountable to elected representatives or to executives.
Therefore, unification of the line departments with the three tiers has been incomplete. As a result, the structure has created power and role confusion as well as the lack of accountability. Although there are many standing committees, their mandates are overlooked as they cannot oblige the government officials who are accountable to their department headquarters.
Outcome of the 'taken-for-grantedness'
Field interactions with officials from different tiers ( Panchayat and line departments is restricted to the top-level officials, which creates a lack of integration at the start of the planning process which ideally should be bottom-up. 
Lack of information-flow between line department(s) and Standing Committees
From the analysis of policy documents and Annual Administrative Reports, it appears that the government is hopeful about the success of standing committee meetings and monthly meetings with executives. However, in reality, line department officials are reluctant to share information with standing committees, and lack interest in participating in the standing committee meetings. Each BDO reports that not all line department officials care to attend monthly meetings. Moreover, since these officials are accountable only to their respective departments, BDOs cannot take any disciplinary action against them.
Lack of effective utilisation of resources
Line department officials commonly plead insufficient staff to carry out effective planning,
proper needs assessments and feasibility estimates. Better coordination can mitigate issues of understaffing through better use of resources and less overlap of initiatives. Policy problems also concede unintended power to bureaucrats and technocrats of the line departments. 
Narratives of Domination
Members of different standing committees as well as BDOs frequently cite instances of domination by the line departments. They identify lack of role-clarity and problem of accountability as prime reasons. However, there are instances of "good officials" too, who because of their good "human qualities" were "kind enough" to listen and care for the collaborative effort to the development.
We have no power to compel them (Line Department Officials) to do things that we need. In fact if they do not follow the Annual Action Plan, we cannot do anything. Although elected representatives and heads of different standing committees try to convince line department officials to recognise local needs, they frequently remain unheard.
There is a separate allowance of Rs. 750/-for the cleaning of water reservoirs. We have tried to convince the PHE department to perform regular cleaning operations … they did not care for our requests … they are government employees. The present mechanism has created space for the line department officials to dominate. Lack of accountability to the local administrative and political cadres hinders proper monitoring and evaluation. As reported by elected representatives and BDOs, this monopoly of line department officials not only creates problems of coordination but also promotes corruption, as there is no local monitoring and evaluation system in operation.
Conclusions
West Bengal is a well administered state, and a state in which governments have been There is an urgent need to devise and reorder the entire system to redefine the hierarchy and respective roles, and to formulate a detailed strategy to enhance collaboration. To tackle this task, a fuller study of issues mentioned by scholars across disciplines is needed, but steps can be taken to combat the immediate problems of lack of co-ordination and accountability of line departments. Mathew and Jain (2005) suggest empowering the standing committees by making them "responsible for approval before, during and after the execution of works." In addition, a thorough study of the practical solutions as provided by scholars such as Goss (2001) and Gendenhuys (2008) 2. The agenda of inter-governmental networking should be continuously refreshed and researched, and continuous reform should be practised by involving all stakeholders.
3. The loose ends in inter-governmental coordination should be identified and tied down through adherence to strict regulations.
4. There should be clearly defined roles, expectations and responsibilities for all stakeholders.
5. Empowerment of the PRI institutions should be accompanied by making line departments accountable to the three tiers of the Panchayat system.
6. The reporting practices should include the standing committees, so that the committees can monitor the progress of the initiatives taken by the various line departments.
7. Different stakeholders including elected representatives, executives, officials and line department staff should be merged with the different standing committees. Operational actions and interactions determine effective interdepartmental coordination in the local government. In the Indian context, especially in West Bengal, the most comprehensive challenge lies at the operational level as the system lacks a proper regulatory mechanism. It is reasonable to emphasise two things: designing the inter-organisational collaboration is an interactive process and demands attention to structural, procedural and cognitive aspects of the organisations; and without careful design of the 'rules of the game' for interdepartmental coordination, the networking remains inefficient and triggers numerous problems in practice, which undermines the real essence of democracy.
